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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article examines two important features of many 
copyright fair use cases: transformative use and commercial 
intermediation. While the issue of transformative use has arisen 
in many fair use cases, there is a lack of consistency and clear 
guidance on the meaning of “transformativeness” and how the 
degree of transformativeness is to be assessed. Additionally, in 
analyzing commercial use, courts have largely failed to 
appreciate the distinctive role played by “commercial 
intermediaries” in facilitating socially beneficial uses of 
copyrighted works. This Article advances economically 
grounded proposals for improving the way in which courts 
analyze transformative use and commercial intermediation. 
First, courts should focus on the economic effects of 
transformation instead of employing a purely conceptual 
analysis. In particular, courts should ascertain any 
complementary or substitutive effects as well as the cost and 
innovative-efficiency implications of the use: the more 
transformative the use, the more it tends to minimize market 
harm to the copyright owner and maximize social benefits such 
as transaction-cost economies and follow-on innovation. Second, 
courts should view commercial intermediaries favorably insofar 
as they facilitate educational or other beneficial fair uses of 
copyrighted works through cost-efficient production or 
substantial innovative investments. In other words, courts 
should view the commercial use in context and recognize that 
commercial uses may nonetheless produce social benefits that 
substantially outweigh any harm caused to copyright owners. 
This Article uses the 2013 Google Books decision as a primary 
case study, supplemented by related cases from the United 
States and abroad, to illustrate these arguments, concluding 
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that the court’s decision to uphold Google’s fair use defense for 
Google Books is well-supported by the complementary 
relationship between Google Books and copyrighted books, 
Google’s substantial investments in promoting productive uses 
of books through Google Books, and transaction-cost and 
innovative-incentive considerations. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 284 
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE ......... 287 
A. The Economics of Copyright Law.................................287 
B. The Economics of Fair Use...........................................290 
II. TRANSFORMATIVE USE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ...... 292 
III. COMMERCIAL INTERMEDIATION: AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE .................................................................... 299 
IV. CASE STUDY: GOOGLE BOOKS ........................................... 307 
A. The Case.........................................................................307 
B. Economic Analysis of Transformative Use in the Case of 
Google Books..........................................................................312 
C. Economic Analysis of Commercial Intermediation in the 
Case of Google Books.............................................................315 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 317 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Fair use” is a crucial defense to copyright infringement. As 
its name suggests, the fair use doctrine strikes a balance 
between the interests of copyright owners and users by 
allowing users to make “fair” uses of copyrighted works for free 
and without the consent of the copyright holder. From the 
perspectives of competition policy and innovation policy, fair 
use is an “important competition-facilitating internal 
mechanism found within [] copyright law” that not only 
“promotes competition between goods and services that are the 
subject of, or connected with, the same set of intellectual 
property rights,” but also “strike[s] a balance between 
protection of initial innovation and further invention and 
creativity”.1  
                                                           
1  Steve D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP ‘Interface’: An Introductory 
Note, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
COMPETITION POLICY 18 (Steven D. Anderman ed. 2007); Burton Ong, The 
Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law in 
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Given the significant role played by fair use in competition 
and innovation policy, it is vital that courts make correct 
decisions on questions of fair use in copyright litigation. The 
Copyright Act instructs courts to consider four factors in 
evaluating whether a defendant’s use of a copyrighted work is 
fair use: (1) “the purpose and character of the use”; (2) “the 
nature of the copyrighted work”; (3) “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used”; and (4) “the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for . . . the copyrighted work.”2 In 
practice, the outcome of the fair use analysis is often 
determined by the first factor, particularly the commerciality 
and transformativeness of the use. Yet in Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,3 the Supreme Court 
remarked that the fourth factor—market effect—“is 
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”4 In 
fact, the first and the fourth factors are closely related. The 
first factor is ultimately just as significant as the fourth factor 
because it influences that market effect analysis. Unauthorized 
commercial use of copyrighted material tends to cause market 
harm5: profits derived from the defendant’s commercial 
                                                                                                                                  
Singapore, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND COMPETITION POLICY 378, 380 (Steven D. Anderman ed. 2007).   
2  The statute provides in full: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, 
is not an infringement of copyright.  In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself 
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
3  471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
4  Id. 
5  There was previously a presumption of market harm in cases of 
commercial use: a commercial user would bear the burden of disproving 
market harm, whereas a noncommercial user would not carry such a 
burden (it would be for the plaintiff to show that the noncommercial use 
entails market harm). See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan 
Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (6th Cir. 1996).  However, 
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exploitation of the plaintiff’s work are likely made at the 
expense of the plaintiff, in that they reflect forgone profits that 
the plaintiff could have earned but for the defendant’s 
infringement or lack of permission. Such forgone profits could 
be caused by the defendant’s selling infringing copies in direct 
competition with the plaintiff or may take the form of lost 
licensing fees that the plaintiff could have charged for the 
defendant’s commercial use. On the other hand, transformative 
use tends to make the defendant’s work more of a complement 
to and less of a substitute for the copyrighted work, thereby 
reducing market harm (if not producing market benefits) to the 
plaintiff.6 The first factor thus goes a step further than the 
fourth factor because it can account for the social benefits of 
transformative uses, which may trump any market harm 
resulting from such unauthorized use. 
Despite its great importance, there is considerable room for 
improvement in how courts analyze the first fair use factor. 
While the issue of transformativeness has arisen in many 
cases, courts lack consistency in how they approach the issue 
and in how they assess the degree of transformation. 
Additionally, in analyzing commercial use, courts have largely 
failed to appreciate the distinctive role played by “commercial 
intermediaries” in facilitating socially beneficial uses of 
copyrighted works. 
This Article advances two economically grounded 
recommendations to improve courts’ analyses of transformative 
use and commercial use by commercial intermediaries under 
the first fair use factor. The economic arguments on 
transformative use and commercial intermediation proposed 
here will be examined through the case study of Google Books.  
Google Books, a groundbreaking undertaking to digitize and 
upload all existing books for the benefit of Internet users, 
incited a controversial legal dispute between copyright 
owners—both publishers and authors—and Google in federal 
                                                                                                                                  
this presumption has arguably been overruled. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994); Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Cambridge Univ. 
Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1236 (N.D. Ga. 2012); Sony BMG 
Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 227 (D. Mass. 2009). 
6  Cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (recognizing that parodies likely will not 
affect the market for the original work); Thomas F. Cotter, 
Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
701, 741 (2010) (noting that in some instances, the unauthorized, 
transformative use of a copyrighted work might increase the property 
owner’s revenue). 
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district court. In 2013, the court upheld Google Books as a fair 
use of copyrighted works.7 The transformative and commercial 
aspects of the project’s use of copyrighted material are worth 
exploring from a broader perspective, in light of economic 
theory and related fair use and fair dealing cases from the 
United States and abroad.  
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I presents an 
overview of the literature on the economics of copyright law 
and, specifically, the economics of fair use. Part II begins with 
a legal analysis of “transformative use” and proceeds to 
advance an economic approach to the issue. It then discusses 
three types of transformative use—criticism and parody, 
derivative use, and change of purpose—in order to illustrate 
the application of an economic approach. Part III offers a 
unique economic perspective on commercial use and, 
specifically, “commercial intermediation,” which often serves 
economically efficient and socially beneficial purposes. The 
favorable treatment of commercial intermediaries advocated 
here can be contrasted with the skeptical view of American and 
Canadian courts toward all commercial uses and their general 
failure to distinguish commercial intermediation from other 
commercial uses in a fair use or fair dealing analysis. Part IV 
describes the Google Books decision, which will then be used as 
the primary case study for the central arguments advanced in 
this Article. The Part proceeds to analyze two important 
aspects of Google Books—transformative use and commercial 
intermediation—pursuant to the economic approach described 
earlier. The Article concludes that the court’s decision 
upholding Google Books as a fair use is well-supported by its 
complementary relationship to copyrighted books, Google’s 
substantial investments in promoting productive uses of books 
through the project, and transaction-cost and innovative-
incentive considerations. 
I. Economic Analysis of Copyright and Fair Use 
A. The Economics of Copyright Law 
Economic analysis of law, an approach that has gained 
significant traction in the United States, enhances the 
consistency and legitimacy of legal developments.8 Copyright 
law’s economic foundation was laid in the Patent and 
                                                           
7  Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
8  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 10 (2003). 
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Copyright Clause of United States Constitution, which states 
that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”9 Thus, the justification for granting 
intellectual property rights, including copyright, is the 
promotion of scientific and artistic progress, rather than simply 
the compensation of creators for their efforts.10 
Economists and legal scholars have long advocated for an 
economic approach to copyright law and policy.11 A seminal 
1966 article by Robert Hurt and Robert Schuchman invites 
readers to focus on “the economic rationale of copyright” 
instead of rights-based rationales such as John Locke’s 
property theory or Immanuel Kant’s personality theory.12 As 
Hurt and Schuchman observe, copyrightable works are 
characterized by substantial creation costs and minimal 
reproduction costs.13 Absent copyright protection, rivals would 
be able to reproduce the work cheaply and sell their copies in 
direct competition with the author (or the author’s publisher). 
Given the uncontrolled supply of copies, the price of a copy 
would be so low that the author or first publisher could not 
recapture its substantial initial expenditure.14 The long-term 
effect of permitting such freeriding of creative efforts would be 
that significantly fewer original works would be created, 
explaining why copyright is sometimes necessary to provide 
adequate incentives for literary, artistic and musical 
creativity.15 Notwithstanding this basic rationale for copyright, 
Hurt and Schuchman argue that policymakers should consider 
                                                           
9  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
10  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1.1 (2d 
ed. 2014). 
11  See Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 
ECONOMICA, NEW SERIES 167 (1934). 
12  Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of 
Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 421-25, 432 (1966).  For a detailed 
discussion of the differences between the rights-based theories and 
economic theory of intellectual property rights, see William W. Fisher, 
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168-199 (Stephen Munzer ed. 2001). 
13  Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 12, at 426, 428; see also William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
14  Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 12, at 425-427; see also HOVENKAMP ET 
AL., supra note 10, § 1.1; Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 326 (1989). 
15  Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 12, at 425, 426; see also HOVENKAMP ET 
AL., supra note 10, § 1.1. 
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whether other reward mechanisms (such as the first-mover 
advantage) would be viable alternatives to copyright protection 
and the overall welfare effects of copyright law.16 
Building on the previous literature, William Landes and 
Richard Posner emphasize an access-versus-incentives tradeoff 
in their scholarship on copyright economics.17 As they describe:  
Copyright protection—the right of the copyright’s 
owner to prevent others from making copies—
trades off the costs of limiting access to a work 
against the benefits of providing incentives to 
create the work in the first place. Striking the 
correct balance between access and incentives is 
the central problem in copyright law. For 
copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its 
principal legal doctrines must, at least 
approximately, maximize the benefits from 
creating additional works minus both the losses 
from limiting access and the costs of 
administering copyright protection.18 
Therefore, while copyright may have the apparent effect of 
incentivizing original creations, it also increases the price of 
access to creative works on which follow-on creations are based, 
by consequence actually increasing the costs associated with 
making many literary, artistic, and musical creations.19 The 
effects of various copyright principles on incentives and access 
thus must be evaluated carefully in order to find the optimal 
reach of copyright for the maximization of creative works in 
terms of quantity and quality.20 After building an economic 
model of copyright,21 Landes and Posner proceed to apply their 
theory to assess certain legal principles that define the 
boundaries of copyright,22 including the legitimacy of separate 
creation,23 the idea-expression distinction,24 the protection of 
                                                           
16  Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 12, at 427-432. 
17  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 22; Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 
326. 
18  Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 326. 
19  Id. at 332, 335. 
20  Id. at 333, 336, 343. 
21  Id. at 333-44. 
22  Id. at 344-63. 
23  For the legitimacy of separate creation, see Sheldon v. MGM Pictures 
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[I]f by some magic a man who had 
never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he 
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derivative works,25 the defense of fair use, and copyright 
duration.26 Their arguments on the fair use defense are 
explored further below. 
B. The Economics of Fair Use 
Turning to scholarship that specifically addresses the 
economics of fair use under copyright law, Wendy Gordon’s 
seminal article in the early 1980s is a convenient starting 
point.27 Gordon considers the fair use defense to be a solution to 
problems of market failure that courts utilize “to permit 
uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable but not 
capable of effectuation through the market.”28 As she observed: 
Fair use is one label courts use when they 
approve a user's departure from the market. A 
useful starting place for analysis of when fair 
use is appropriate is therefore an identification 
of when flaws in the market might make reliance 
on the judiciary's own analysis of social benefit 
appropriate. . . . [T]here are certain “conditions 
of perfect competition”—or assumptions about 
how a proper transactional setting should look—
whose failure is particularly likely to trigger in 
the courts an unwillingness to rely on the 
owner's market right to achieve dissemination.29 
Gordon proposes a three-step analysis of relevant economic 
considerations that should inform a court’s decision as to 
whether to accept the fair use defense in a particular case. 
First, the unauthorized user must identify a market failure 
problem, such as high transaction costs (“the cost of reaching 
and enforcing bargains”)30 or significant positive externalities 
                                                                                                                                  
would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that 
poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.”). 
24  For the idea-expression distinction, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no 
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea …, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.). 
25  The protection of derivative works is provided for under 17 U.S.C. § 103 
(2012). 
26  For copyright duration, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (2012). 
27  Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600 (1982). 
28  Id. at 1601. 
29  Id. at 1614. 
30  Id. at 1628. 
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(where “the market structure prevents [the user] from being 
able to capitalize on the [social] benefits to be realized”).31 
Second, the user must demonstrate that the social benefits 
flowing from the use exceed the ex post market harm to the 
copyright holder, such that the user’s bid price would have 
exceeded the copyright holder’s ask price for a welfare-
enhancing transaction but for the market failure. Finally, if 
both market failure and ex post overall benefit can be 
established, the plaintiff must demonstrate that permitting the 
use would have significantly impaired incentives to create his 
work and comparable works from an ex ante perspective.32  
Landes and Posner similarly argue for a cost-benefit 
analysis of fair use and analyze four fair use situations from an 
economic perspective.33 In the first situation, A wants to briefly 
quote B’s work. While this is valuable to A, A would only do so 
in reliance on the fair use defense and would not incur 
significant transaction costs in clearing the copyright with B, 
who would have nothing to lose in any event.34 In the second 
scenario, a book review briefly quotes the book under review. 
Not only do reviewers benefit from the fair use defense by 
“economizing on transaction costs,” but book copyright holders 
also derive long-term benefit from this “credible form of book 
advertising” when prior clearance is unnecessary for the 
reproduction of short book extracts.35 For the third example, 
parodies, the fair use defense is necessary to prevent the 
repression of such “a particularly effective form of criticism.”36 
Finally, and perhaps most relevant to this article, Landes and 
Posner analyze the situation of “productive fair use,”37 or 
transformative fair use38: 
A productive use is one that lowers the cost of 
expression and tends to increase the number of 
works, while a reproductive one simply increases 
the number of “copies” of a given work, reduces 
the gross profits of the author, and reduces the 
incentives to create works. Not surprisingly, a 
                                                           
31  Id. at 1631. 
32  Id. at 1614-47. 
33  Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 357-61; see also LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 8, at 115-23. 
34  Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 357. 
35  Id. at 358-59. 
36  Id. at 359. 
37  Id. at 360 (emphasis omitted). 
38  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 123. 
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fair use defense for a productive use is looked on 
more favorably than such a defense for a 
reproductive use.39 
Parts II and III build on the scholarship of Gordon, Landes, 
and Posner on the economics of fair use and specifically focuses 
on the economic analysis of “transformative use” and 
“commercial use” under the first fair use factor. Regarding 
“transformative use,” Part II contends that courts should focus 
on the economic effects, rather than conceptual analysis, of 
transformation, ascertaining the complementary or 
substitutive effects as well as cost and innovative-efficiency 
implications of the use. The more transformative the use, the 
more it tends to minimize market harm to the copyright owner 
and maximize social benefits such as transaction-cost 
economies and follow-on innovation. Regarding “commercial 
use,” Part III argues that commercial intermediaries—such as 
Google in the case of Google Books—should be considered 
favorably by courts when they seek to justify their commercial 
use by facilitating end consumers’ educational use of 
copyrighted works through cost-efficient production or 
substantial innovative investments. Both arguments will be 
illustrated in Part IV through the case study of Google Books, 
amongst other relevant fair use and fair dealing cases from the 
United States and abroad. 
II. Transformative Use: An Economic Perspective 
In analyzing the first fair use factor—the purpose and 
character of the defendant’s use—courts typically inquire into 
whether the use is transformative, apart from whether it is for 
commercial purposes. Transformative use arguably outweighs 
commercial use in determining overall fairness, as the 
Supreme Court indicated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc.40: 
[T]he more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding 
of fair use. . . . [When] the second use is 
transformative, market substitution is at least 
                                                           
39  Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 360. 
40  510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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less certain, and market harm may not be so 
readily inferred.41 
The importance of the transformative/nontransformative 
distinction, as well as the degree of transformation, is beyond 
question. But what exactly do courts mean by the word 
“transformative”? 
To answer this question, the starting point is the test for 
transformative use suggested in Campbell, namely, “whether 
the new work . . . adds something new, with a further purpose 
or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”42 This test, which focuses on “add[ing] 
something new” and “altering” the original work, is difficult to 
reconcile with recent cases in which courts have upheld as 
transformative the mere replication of the original creation put 
to an alternative use.43 In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com,44 the use 
of thumbnail images reproduced by Google were deemed 
“highly transformative.” According to the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, “[a]lthough an image may have been created 
originally to serve an entertainment, aesthetic, or informative 
function, a search engine transforms the image into a pointer 
directing a user to a source of information,” and hence 
“provide[s] social benefit by incorporating an original work into 
a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”45 In Bill 
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,46 the reprinting of 
concert posters in a rock band’s biography was found to be for 
the “transformative purpose of enhancing the biographical 
information . . . a purpose separate and distinct from the 
original artistic and promotional purpose for which the 
[posters] were created.”47 Recent fair use decisions such as 
these therefore support a broad definition of “transformation,” 
including not only transformation of content, but also 
transformation of function.48 This can be justified if the focus of 
                                                           
41  Id. at 579, 591. 
42  Id. at 579. 
43  See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 491 (5th ed. 
2010). 
44  508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). Notably, this case was referenced in the 
court’s fair use analysis of Google Books. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
45  508 F.3d at 1146. 
46  448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). The court also referenced this case in its 
discussion of Google Books. Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291. 
47  448 F.3d at 610. 
48  LEAFFER, supra note 43, at 491. 
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a fair use analysis is on the social benefits and market effects in 
light of the defendant’s alternative use.  
But classifying a use as transformative is only the starting 
point. According to Campbell, courts should assess the degree of 
transformation to measure the relative fairness of the 
defendant’s use.49 While it is easy to say that, as 
transformativeness increases, so does the likelihood of fair 
use,50 it is often difficult to gauge the degree of transformation 
in an actual case. Given the diversity of works under copyright 
and the variety of ways in which one can use copyrighted 
works, courts have struggled to identify common parameters 
for distinguishing more transformative uses from less 
transformative uses. One possibility is to look at proportions of 
original and new material, as suggested in the United 
Kingdom’s decision in Hubbard v. Vosper51: “To take long 
extracts and attach short comments may be unfair[;] [b]ut, 
short extracts and long comments may be fair.”52 
Notwithstanding that this may be a good test for criticism or 
review cases, its utility is doubtful in cases of parody (where 
the original content is modified directly) or mere change of 
purpose (where there is no added or modified content). Another 
possible measure is time spent on transformation relative to 
time spent on creating the original. But time spent may not 
necessarily translate into socially beneficial creative works that 
copyright law seeks to promote.53 For example, it may take a 
                                                           
49  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
50  Id. at 579. 
51  [1972] 2 QB 84. 
52  Id. at 94; see also Johnstone v. Bernard Jones Publications Ltd. [1938] Ch 
599 at 603-604 (“[I]f a defendant published long and important extracts 
from a plaintiff’s work and added to those extracts some brief criticisms 
upon them, I think the Court would be very ready to arrive at the 
conclusion that that was not a fair dealing within the section.”). 
53  See e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 429 (1984) (“[Copyright] is intended to motivate the creative activity 
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow 
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired.”); Jason Iuliano, Is Legal File Sharing 
Legal? An Analysis of the Berne Three-Step Test, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 464, 
482, n.114 (2011) (“The purpose of copyright and related rights is twofold: 
to encourage a dynamic creative culture, while returning value to creators 
so that they can lead a dignified economic existence, and to provide 
widespread, affordable access to content for the public.”); Pierre N. Leval, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990) (“The 
copyright law embodies a recognition that creative intellectual activity is 
vital to the well-being of society.  It is a pragmatic measure by which 
society confers monopoly-exploitation benefits for a limited duration on 
authors and artists (as it does for inventors), in order to obtain for itself 
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long time to produce a novel-based film, but the incremental 
creativity involved is likely minimal if the movie tells the same 
story as the novel. 
Focusing on the economic effects of transformation helps 
solve the difficulty in assessing degree of transformation. 
Under the economic approach advocated in this Article, the 
degree is objectively assessed by reference to the social costs 
and benefits of the transformative use. The more 
transformative the use, the more it tends to minimize market 
harm to the copyright owner (note that harm to the owner has 
the effect of disincentivizing original creation going forward, 
which is a social cost) and maximize social benefits such as 
transaction-cost economies and follow-on innovation.54 The 
focus is no longer on content-based, durational, or conceptual 
analysis of transformation, but on the actual effects of 
transformative use. This approach tightens the link between 
the first factor (purpose and character of the defendant’s use) 
and the fourth factor (market effect). Judge Posner’s suggestion 
in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd.55 is helpful in 
understanding and assessing the market impact of a 
transformative use: 
[W]e may say that copying that is 
complementary to the copyrighted work (in the 
sense that nails are complements of hammers) is 
fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the 
copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are 
substitutes for pegs or screws), or for derivative 
works from the copyrighted work . . . is not fair 
use.56 
In other words, the more transformative the use, the 
smaller its substitutive effects or the greater its 
complementary effects on the original work will be. The degree 
of substitution or complementarity between the original work 
and the transformative use determines the overall market 
harm (or benefit) to the copyright owner.  
The practical application of this economic approach can be 
illustrated through three types of transformative use cases. 
The first type of cases concerns criticism, reviews, and 
                                                                                                                                  
the intellectual and practical enrichment that results from creative 
endeavors.”). 
54  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 122-23. 
55  292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
56  Id. at 517. 
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parodies. Positive book reviews should be considered an 
instance of transformative complementary use alongside 
change of purposes cases (such as Google Books) discussed 
below.57 But what about negative reviews or parodies that 
expose the subject matter to criticism? In most cases, negative 
reviews and parodies are neither complements to (they do not 
increase demand) nor substitutes for (they do not serve 
demand) the subject matter under criticism.58 Negative reviews 
and parodies have the effect of impairing demand for the 
criticized matter by revealing its weaknesses, but this is very 
different from the market substitutive harm that copyright law 
guards against.59 As Judge Posner explained, “The harm to an 
author that comes from drawing attention to the lack of value 
of the intellectual property he has created is not the kind of 
harm that a law intended to encourage the production of 
intellectual property seeks to prevent.”60 In fact, book reviews 
benefit society by reducing readers’ search costs and directing 
them to relevant and well-written books.61 These benefits and 
the lack of substitutive harm—together with the transaction-
cost arguments presented above—support a fair use defense for 
reviews and parodies. 
The second type of cases relates to derivative works. Under 
American copyright law, a derivative work is defined as “a 
work based upon one or more preexisting works” and may exist 
in “any . . . form in which a work may be recast, transformed, 
or adapted.”62 The law further provides that a copyright holder 
“has the exclusive righ[t] . . . to prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work.”63 A derivative work, like a film 
based on a novel, can be both substitutive of and 
complementary to the preexisting work.64 The definition of 
“derivative work” above thus suggests that derivative use 
                                                           
57  See infra Part IV.B. 
58  Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2002); 1 
KEVIN GARNETT ET AL., COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 9-60 
(16th ed. 2011); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 117; RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54 (8th ed. 2011); Landes & Posner, 
supra note 13, at 360.  
59  Ty, 292 F.3d at 518; POSNER, supra note 58, at 54.  
60  POSNER, supra note 58, at 54. 
61  Id.  
62  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
63  Id. § 106(2). 
64  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 109; Cotter, supra note 6, at 717-18; 
Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 354, 360. 
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would qualify as transformative for fair use purposes.65 This 
view was nevertheless rejected by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol 
Publishing Group.66 As the Second Circuit explained, 
“[a]lthough derivative works that are subject to the author's 
copyright transform an original work into a new mode of 
presentation, such works—unlike works of fair use—take 
expression for purposes that are not ‘transformative.’”67 The 
court held that the defendant’s trivia quiz book, The Seinfeld 
Aptitude Test, drew “directly from the Seinfeld episodes 
without substantial alteration” and merely “repackage[d] 
Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers.”68 While the lack of 
material alteration may justify the court’s conclusion on the 
facts, one may query whether the court’s extreme position that 
derivative uses are never transformative is correct. The Second 
Circuit’s view was nonetheless supported by Judge Posner in 
Ty, where the judge opined that “copying that is a substitute 
for . . . derivative works from the copyrighted work . . . is not 
fair use.”69 However, the judge also remarked that “[w]ere 
control of derivative works not part of a copyright owner’s 
bundle of rights, it would be clear that [the defendant’s Beanie 
Baby collectors’ guides] fell on the complement side of the 
divide and so were sheltered by the fair-use defense.”70  
Despite Judge Posner’s decision in Ty, there is good reason 
to believe that derivative works that substantially alter the 
function or substance of the pre-existing work not only are poor 
substitutes for, but can be good complements to, the 
preexisting work.71 In such cases, the primary harm lies in the 
substitutive effects upon the derivative work markets (sales or 
licensing), rather than upon the preexisting work’s markets. 
Courts should be careful in setting the limits of derivative work 
markets over which copyright owners have exclusivity, taking 
innovation incentive effects into account. It makes little 
                                                           
65  Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Pub’g Grp., 955 F. Supp. 260, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“[A] derivative work, by definition, transforms an original. . . . 
Where, as here, a work is transformative, the crux of the fair use analysis 
remains: the Court must proceed with a careful consideration of the 
remaining three factors, while merely granting defendants an advantage 
at the outset.” (citations omitted)). 
66 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
67  Id. at 143. 
68  Id. at 142-43. 
69  Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). 
70  Id. at 518. 
71  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994); Cotter, 
supra note 6, at 746. 
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economic sense to deny the fair use defense to every derivative 
use of a work: copyright owners should not have an unlimited 
monopoly over all unlicensed derivative works.72 Exclusivity 
should be limited to derivative works within contemplation 
when the preexisting work was produced—any protection 
beyond that would not provide copyright owners with extra 
innovation incentives.73 On the other hand, rewarding the user 
for his efforts by accepting his fair use defense helps encourage 
the creation of substantially transformative derivative works 
that possibly provide significant social benefits.74 To deny the 
user the protection of fair use, forcing the user to seek a license 
from (and surrender parts of his profits to) the copyright 
owner, would only serve to disincentivize follow-on 
innovation.75 The impact would be particularly severe in cases 
involving significant positive externalities (social benefits that 
the user fails to internalize by charging the beneficiaries), 
where the inherent risk of underproduction calls for greater 
protection of innovation incentives.76 There may be close cases 
where it is difficult to tell whether the copyright owner has 
contemplated the defendant’s work, and where courts have to 
decide based on rough indications such as the defendant’s 
contribution (in transformation) relative to the plaintiff’s 
contribution (in original creation).77 
The third type of transformative use cases is “change of 
purpose” cases, of which Perfect 10 and Bill Graham Archives 
(discussed above) are examples. The transformative use of 
books by Google as part of Google Books also falls within this 
category, and the economic analysis of transformation by 
                                                           
72  Cf. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“Indeed, if the secondary work sufficiently transforms the 
expression of the original work such that the two works cease to be 
substantially similar, then the secondary work is not a derivative work 
and, for that matter, does not infringe the copyright of the original 
work.”).  
73  See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 110; Cotter, supra note 6, at 744; 
see also Shyam Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1603-09 (2009); Christina Bohannan, Copyright 
Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 970, 974, 
987 (2007)); Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 354. 
74  See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 122-23. 
75  See Cotter, supra note 6, at 743. 
76  See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 122; Cotter, supra note 6, at 733-
35, 741. 
77  See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 122-23; Cotter, supra note 6, at 
746. In close cases, therefore, courts may have to fall back on conventional 
indicators of transformation, such as proportions and time spent on 
creation.  
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“change of purpose” will be illustrated through that case 
below.78 As further explained in Part III, these cases often 
involve the complementary, unintended use of copyrighted 
works that are beneficial, not harmful, to the copyright owner. 
Recognizing such use as fair use would help overcome 
transaction costs and preserve innovation incentives on the 
part of transformative users.  
To conclude, “The question for an economist is . . . the 
impact of the copying on the demand for the original and the 
potential cost savings and other benefits that are likely to 
arise” from permitting the transformative use in question.79 
The economic approach directs courts to focus on common 
economic considerations, such as complementarity and 
substitution, transaction costs, innovation incentives, and 
social benefits, in analyzing different instances of 
transformative use. This focus would greatly improve the 
coherence and legitimacy of fair use decisions. 
III. Commercial Intermediation: An Economic 
Perspective 
The commerciality of an unauthorized use is an important 
consideration under the first fair use factor and generally 
undermines a fair use defense.80 Yet it need not—and should 
not—always have that effect. Certain uses by commercial 
entities may benefit society by creating innovative products or 
reducing costs. These benefits can render insignificant any 
harm caused to copyright owners. Uses by Google and other 
“commercial intermediaries” that further facilitate end 
consumers’ beneficial, legitimate uses of copyrighted works fall 
into this category of commercial use. This Part explores the 
concept of “commercial intermediation” from an economic 
perspective. 
Google Books, which will be examined in more detail in 
Part IV, is a prime example of a commercial intermediary. 
There, Google, as a business organization deriving profits from 
Google Books, was clearly engaging in commercial use of the 
books.81 Nevertheless, the court in that case sought to draw a 
                                                           
78 See infra Part IV.B. 
79  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 123. 
80  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 
562 (1985). 
81  Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013).  
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distinction between direct and indirect commercialization.82 
According to the judge, “Google does not sell the scans it has 
made of books” but only “benefit[s] commercially in the sense 
that users are drawn to the Google websites by the ability to 
search Google Books.”83 The same distinction has been drawn 
in reverse engineering cases in the past.84 Not every court has 
attached significance to the “directness” of commercialization, 
however. For instance, it was stated in A&M Records v. 
Napster85 that “[d]irect economic benefit is not required to 
demonstrate a commercial use,” and that “repeated and 
exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are 
not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use.”86 The 
most important issue is simply the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial use,87 which depends on 
“whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price,” “not 
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain.”88 Hence, 
most courts would have focused on the simple fact that Google 
profited from its infringement and counted this against the 
company in their fair use analysis, without considering the 
degree of commercialism and the noncommercial benefits of 
Google Books. 
Such a rigid approach ignores other considerations of fair 
use. The statutory provision expressly invites courts to consider 
“whether [the] use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes” in analyzing the first fair use factor.89 
Commercial educational use, such as Google’s use of books to 
                                                           
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  See, e.g., Sega Enterprises Ltd v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“[A]lthough Accolade’s ultimate purpose was the release of Genesis-
compatible games for sale, its direct purpose in copying Sega’s code . . . 
was simply to study the functional requirements for Genesis compatibility 
so that it could modify existing games and make them usable with the 
Genesis console”). Accolade’s use was hence “an intermediate one only and 
thus any commercial ‘exploitation’ was indirect or derivative,” id., and 
“the commercial aspect of its use can best be described as of minimal 
significance.” Id. at 1523. 
85  239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). 
86  Id. at 1015. 
87  17 U.S.C. § 107 explicitly invites courts to consider “whether [the] use is of 
a commercial nature” under the factor of “purpose and character of the 
use.” 
88  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 
(1985). 
89  See supra note 2. 
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achieve the educational aims of Google Books,90 lies between 
the extremes of purely commercial use and noncommercial 
educational use, and deserves special consideration. 
This concept of “commercial intermediation” should be 
recognized in courts’ analyses of fair use. Commercial 
intermediaries—such as Google in the case of Google Books—
play an important role in facilitating educational or other 
beneficial fair uses of copyrighted works. Specifically, 
commercial intermediaries may greatly aid the exercise of fair 
use rights by end users by reducing the cost and thus 
increasing the frequency at which fair uses are made of 
copyrighted works, notwithstanding that the intermediaries 
derive profit from end users in the process of facilitation. 
Accordingly, in deciding whether the fair use defense applies, 
courts should look upon commercial uses favorably when they 
are intended to facilitate end consumers’ beneficial, legitimate 
uses of copyrighted works. 
Unfortunately, courts have not generally viewed 
commercial intermediation as a distinctive type of commercial 
use. Google, in providing the Google Books service, stands in a 
similar position to copyshops that produce coursepacks 
(bundles of duplicated educational materials) for students. If 
an individual student reproduces a bundle of materials for 
private study or research, provided that she copies 
nonexcessive portions of copyrighted works, this will likely be 
considered fair use for a nonprofit educational purpose. Should 
the analysis change if the same bundle of materials is 
reproduced by a copyshop for the student at a fee? This issue 
was considered in Princeton University Press v. Michigan 
Document Services, Inc.,91 where the defendant copyshop’s fair 
use argument was premised on the idea of commercial 
intermediation: “[T]he copying at issue . . . would be considered 
‘nonprofit educational’ if done by the students or professors 
themselves,” and the copyshop “can profitably produce multiple 
copies for less than it would cost the professors or the students 
to make the same number of copies.”92 From an economic 
perspective, the fact that the same beneficial, educational 
purpose can be achieved at a lower cost would seem to justify a 
finding of fair use. However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit rejected the copyshop’s defense, emphasizing that “the 
                                                           
90  Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
91  99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
92  Id. at 1389.  
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copying . . . was performed on a profit-making basis by a 
commercial enterprise” and that “courts have . . . properly 
rejected attempts by for-profit users to stand in the shoes of 
their customers making nonprofit or noncommercial uses.”93  
In dissent, Judge Merritt was nevertheless receptive to the 
copyshop’s argument: 
Our political economy generally encourages the 
division and specialization of labor. There is no 
reason why in this instance the law should 
discourage high schools, colleges, students and 
professors from hiring the labor of others to 
make their copies any more than there is a 
reason to discourage lawyers from hiring 
paralegals to make copies for clients and courts. 
The [majority’s] distinction in this case based on 
the division of labor—who does the copying—is 
short sighted and unsound economically. . . . The 
[majority] errs by focusing on the “use” of the 
materials made by the copyshop in making the 
copies rather than upon the real user of the 
materials—the students. Neither the District 
Court nor [the majority] provides a rationale as 
to why the copyshops cannot “stand in the shoes” 
of their customers in making copies for 
noncommercial, educational purposes where the 
copying would be fair use if undertaken by the 
professor or the student personally.94 
Judge Merritt also emphasized the public right to fair use 
under copyright law: 
                                                           
93  Id. at 1389 (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 420 n.34 (1985)).        
94  Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381, 1395 
(6th Cir. 1996). 
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Rights of copyright owners are tempered by the 
rights of the public. . . . The public has the right 
to make fair use of a copyrighted work and to 
exercise that right without requesting 
permission from, or paying any fee to, the 
copyright holder. The essence of copyright is the 
promotion of learning—not the enrichment of 
publishers.95 
This point was echoed in the well-known Canadian 
Supreme Court decision CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society of 
Upper Canada,96 in which Chief Justice McLachlin stated that 
“[t]he fair dealing exception . . . is a user’s right,” which “should 
not be given a restrictive interpretation or this could result in 
the undue restriction of users’ rights.”97 CCH Canadian Ltd. 
concerned the “custom photocopy service” of the Great Library 
of the Law Society of Upper Canada, where library staff 
photocopied books on demand from patrons.98 The Supreme 
Court, in holding that “the Law Society could rely on the 
[research] purposes of its patrons to prove that its dealings 
were fair,”99 explained: 
When the Great Library staff make copies of the 
requested cases, statutes, excerpts from legal 
texts and legal commentary, they do so for the 
purpose of research . . . . Put simply, its custom 
photocopy service helps to ensure that legal 
professionals in Ontario can access the materials 
necessary to conduct the research required to 
carry on the practice of law. In sum, the Law 
Society’s custom photocopy service is an integral 
part of the legal research process . . . .100 
This reflects the idea of intermediation: the library, through 
its photocopy service, facilitated the research of legal 
professionals, and it would be artificial to separate the 
purposes of the facilitator and end users. The end users’ 
purpose is the facilitator’s purpose—research. The Canadian 
Supreme Court also clarified that “the Law Society [could] rely 
                                                           
95  Id. 
96  [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.). 
97  Id. at 48, 54. 
98  Id. at 47. 
99 Id. at 62. 
100 Id. at 64. 
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on its general practice to establish fair dealing” without the 
need “to adduce evidence that every patron uses the material 
provided for in a fair dealing manner.”101  
The Canadian Supreme Court was confronted with a 
similar issue in Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright 
Licensing Agency (Access Copyright),102 which concerned 
schoolteachers who duplicated copyright materials for in-class 
dissemination.103 The court reiterated that “fair dealing is a 
‘user’s right,’ and the relevant perspective when considering 
whether the dealing is for an allowable purpose . . . is that of 
the user.”104 In Alberta Education, “the teacher’s purpose in 
providing copies [was] to enable the students to have the 
material they need for the purpose of studying. The 
teacher/copier therefore shares a symbiotic purpose with the 
student/user . . . .”105 This liberal approach to the Canadian 
defense of fair dealing for research or private study106 should be 
contrasted with the narrow scope of the equivalent UK 
defense,107 which is inapplicable to 
[c]opying by a person other than the researcher 
or student himself . . . if . . . [that] person . . . 
knows or has reason to believe that it will result 
in copies of substantially the same material 
being provided to more than one person at 
substantially the same time and for substantially 
the same purpose.108  
A teacher who distributes photocopies of a textbook excerpt 
to his students surely cannot rely on the United Kingdom 
defense.109 The outcome would be the same in New Zealand,110 
where the Auckland High Court has clarified that the fair 
                                                           
101 Id. at 63. 
102 [2012] 2 S.C.R. 345 (Can.). 
103 Id. at 1 (“The issue in this appeal is whether photocopies made by 
teachers to distribute to students as part of class instruction can qualify 
as fair dealing under the Copyright Act.”). 
104 Id. at 22. 
105 Id. at 23. 
106 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, § 29 (Can.). 
107 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 29 (Eng.) (governing fair 
dealing for noncommercial research or private study). 
108 Id. § 29(3). 
109 LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 253-54 
(4th ed. 2014); GARNETT ET AL., supra note 58, § 9-38. 
110 Copyright Act 1994, s 43 (N.Z.). 
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dealing purpose of research or private study refers to the 
purpose of “the person doing the copying.”111 
The Canadian Supreme Court nonetheless emphasized in 
both cases that the intermediaries (the library and school 
teachers) did not copy for a commercial purpose. In CCH 
Canadian, Ltd., the court stressed that “the Law Society [did] 
not profit from this service” and that its only purpose was to 
facilitate legal research.112 In Alberta, the court acknowledged 
“the principle that copiers cannot camouflage their own distinct 
[commercial] purpose by purporting to conflate it with the 
research or study purposes of the ultimate user.”113 This 
reflects the court’s skepticism towards commercial 
intermediation and its adherence to the general view that 
commercial uses tend to be unfair. 
Courts’ hostility to commercial intermediation is unjustified 
from an economic point of view. Commercialism is certainly a 
relevant factor, but it must be carefully considered in its 
context. Courts should adopt a functional or economic 
perspective of commercial intermediaries and view them as 
essential facilitators of educational or other legitimate 
copyright uses. As the Australian Copyright Law Review 
Committee previously recommended, “[fair] dealings should not 
exclude activities where a person conducts a dealing on behalf 
of another on a for-profit basis,” and courts should be allowed 
to account for “the fact that a person who provided a 
commercial copying service to students provided such a service 
on the understanding that the material copied was for the 
purpose of each student’s own research or study.”114 Take the 
example, again, of coursepacks. A university department can 
either internally produce coursepacks for students or outsource 
production to a copyshop specializing in mass photocopying. 
Due to constrained resources or the desire to minimize cost, the 
department may prefer outsourcing to internal production.115 
                                                           
111 CCH Copyright Licensing Ltd. v University of Auckland [2002] 3 NZLR 76 
(HC) at [52] (N.Z.). 
112 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] S.C.R. 339, 
para. 64 (Can.). 
113 Alberta v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, [2012] S.C.R. 345, para. 
21 (Can.). 
114 Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968, Part I: Exceptions to the 
Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners, September 1998, COPYRIGHT L. 
REV. COMMITTEE, §§ 6.98-6.99.  
115 Stephanie Overby, Outsourcing Definition and Solutions, CIO, http:// 
www.cio.com/article/40380/Outsourcing_Definition_and_Solutions; see 
also Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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In fact, a copyshop can likely produce coursepacks at a lower 
cost than the department due to specialization and economies 
of scale. Outsourcing in this case involves replacing a 
noncommercial intermediary (the university department) with 
a commercial intermediary (the copyshop) to save costs. Even if 
the copyshop raises the price of coursepacks to a level higher 
than that charged by the university, the price elevation merely 
results in a wealth transfer (from students to the copyshop) 
without a consequential output reduction, as students are 
generally required to purchase teacher-prescribed coursepacks. 
Society overall benefits from production cost savings attributed 
to outsourcing to a commercial intermediary. 
Commercial intermediation can be defended not only on 
cost-efficiency grounds, but also on the basis of innovation-
incentive considerations. This argument will be illustrated 
further in Part IV below through greater economic analysis of 
Google as a commercial intermediary in the case of Google 
Books.116 There is a need to incentivize commercial entities 
such as Google to make costly and risky investments that 
facilitate (by reducing the cost or increasing the frequency of) 
socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works by end consumers. 
Their incentives to invest and innovate can be better preserved 
by placing their commercial use in the context of the 
noncommercial, beneficial uses that they facilitate and, 
accordingly, in the fair use category. Adopting an economic 
approach to commercial intermediation in a fair use analysis 
therefore helps to promote innovative efficiency. 
The main concern about commercialism is its tendency to 
cause market harm. Indeed, large-scale, unauthorized copying 
by a commercial undertaking may result in substantial lost 
sales of copyrighted works or forgone licensing revenue. 
Nevertheless, whether market harm actually results from 
commercial use is still a fact-dependent question. In the 
coursepack context, students are unlikely to purchase the 
entire book if all they need is one or two chapters,117 and the 
market for book excerpts (per-page or per-chapter book access) 
remains underdeveloped.118 Likewise, as will be explained 
below, individual licensing from a myriad of book rightsholders 
                                                           
116 See infra Part IV.C. 
117 Alberta v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, [2012] S.C.R. 345, para. 
36 (Can.). 
118 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1237-1239, 1243 
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is not a feasible option for a book digitization project as 
substantial as Google Books.119 Moreover, courts should 
carefully balance the community benefits realized by 
commercial intermediaries against the harm caused to 
individual copyright owners. Where a commercial intermediary 
brings significant educational or other benefits to society 
through its cost-efficient production (for example, of 
coursepacks) or substantial innovative investments (for 
example, as with Google Books)120, courts should generally be 
persuaded to uphold the intermediary’s fair use defense 
notwithstanding its commercial nature.  
IV. Case Study: Google Books 
A. The Case 
Google Book Search is an ambitious project that began in 
2004 when Google set out to digitize all published books for 
online searching by Internet users.121 Google obtained books 
from the largest libraries in the world and digitized them at 
high speed.122 The scanned books were made available online 
for keyword searching, and Google would display snippets of 
books containing the searched-for words or phrases.123 Google 
Books would not provide full access to books, save for those 
that were out of copyright.124 Google’s initial plan was to offer 
search service only, although it started to negotiate with book 
publishers about selling digitized books through Google 
Books.125 
Google Books provides overwhelming educational and 
knowledge-dissemination benefits, as the Southern District of 
New York noted in its recent judgment on fair use.126 Yet, 
despite its virtues, Google Books is controversial because 
Google did not obtain permission from copyright owners before 
                                                           
119 See infra Part IV.B. 
120 See infra Part IV.C. 
121 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (Authors Guild II), 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 
285 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (Authors Guild I), 
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123 Authors Guild II, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 286; Authors Guild I, 770 F. Supp. 2d 
at 670. 
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scanning the books.127 Indeed, the transaction cost of obtaining 
a license from all rightsholders would have been so high that 
Google would perhaps not be able to profit from the Google 
Books service. Hence, the Google Books project could only be 
feasibly undertaken without prior copyright permission. In 
2005, book rightsholders, including authors and publishers, 
commenced an action against Google.128 Google relied on fair 
use as a defense to copyright infringement.129 That defense is 
the subject of the court’s decision in late 2013. 
Before the court’s final ruling, Google attempted to settle 
with the authors and publishers.130 The class action settlement 
agreement submitted for the court’s approval in 2009 put 
forward a groundbreaking business plan for online sales of 
books that even included orphan works (books in copyright 
with untraceable copyright ownership).131 Under the plan, 
Google could, amongst other things, “continue to digitize 
[b]ooks” and “sell online access to individual [b]ooks”.132 This 
would include all out-of-print books by default, subject to each 
copyright owner’s right to opt out.133 In-print books would only 
be included if their rightsholders opted in.134 Book sales 
revenue would be shared between Google and rightsholders on 
a sixty-three to thirty-seven percent basis, subject to individual 
re-negotiation.135 A Book Rights Registry would be set up to 
collect sales revenue and to search for orphan work owners.136 
An orphan work owner who eventually turned up could still 
collect sales revenue of its book over the past ten years and 
choose to have the book excluded from Google’s distribution 
scheme.137 
The court nevertheless decided to reject the proposed 
settlement in 2011 citing, inter alia, copyright and antitrust 
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concerns.138 The primary copyright concern was that an opt-out 
system would result in involuntary copyright transfers 
contrary to § 201(e) of the United States Copyright Act.139 
According to the court, “it is incongruous with the purpose of 
the copyright laws to place the onus on copyright owners to 
come forward to protect their rights when Google copied their 
works without first seeking their permission.”140 
Such a concern might have been exaggerated, as failure to 
opt out within good time could have been taken as implied 
permission from the copyright owner.141 Besides, it is doubtful 
whether an owner would have much to lose if it would be 
entitled to ten years of sales revenue upon eventual 
appearance. To insist that such a service have on an opt-in 
system and that Google bargain with individual rightsholders 
would be hugely inefficient, especially when negotiations with 
orphan work owners are simply impossible until the owners 
have been identified. As one commentator observed: 
Public policy ought not to be indifferent between 
default positions, for they matter enormously as 
a consequential matter. The opt-out nature of the 
rejected Google Book Search settlement promised 
to bring millions of more books to the consuming 
public than would a settlement founded on opt-
in. Judge Chin’s invitation to amend the 
agreement to include only those authors who 
affirmatively grant permission misses these 
points entirely, and perversely denies consumers 
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access to orphan works that they could otherwise 
have enjoyed.142 
The rejection of the class settlement was a missed 
opportunity to develop a sustainable, pioneering, and gigantic 
book sales network to the mutual benefit of rightsholders and 
the public. Nevertheless, in November 2013, the court rendered 
an important decision in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 
upholding Google Book Search, the original book search service 
provided by Google, under the fair use exception in copyright 
law.143 Below is a brief summary of the court’s reasoning. Parts 
IV.B and IV.C will examine the transformative and commercial 
aspects of Google Books in greater detail. 
The court began by stating that the four fair use factors—
purpose and character of the defendant’s use, nature of the 
plaintiff’s work, amount taken, and market effect144—should be 
“explored and weighed together.”145 The court considered the 
distinction between transformative and nontransformative use 
under the first factor to be a “key consideration” in a fair use 
analysis.146 It proceeded to emphasize the “highly 
transformative” nature of Google Books: by digitizing books for 
online searching, Google “use[d] words for a different purpose—
it use[d] snippets of text to act as pointers directing users to a 
broad selection of books.”147 Regarding the commerciality of 
Google’s use, the court highlighted the fact that Google was not 
involved in “direct commercialization” of the books, but only 
profited indirectly from the Internet traffic attributed to the 
Google Books service.148 It also stressed the “important 
educational purposes” of Google Books notwithstanding the 
profit-making desires of Google149—an important point to be 
explored below.150 
Turning to the second factor—nature of the plaintiff’s 
work—the court noted that the digitized books were published 
and mostly nonfictional. Both features (published as opposed to 
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unpublished, nonfictional rather than fictional), tended to 
support a fair use defense. Regarding the third factor—amount 
taken—Google’s use was clearly substantial quantitatively, 
given that it “scan[ned] the full text of books—the entire 
books—and it copie[d] verbatim expression.”151 However, the 
court concluded that a more important consideration was 
whether the amount taken was qualitatively substantial, 
whether Google’s usage was no more than necessary for 
attaining the educational benefits of Google Books.152 As the 
court observed, it was necessary for Google to digitize the 
whole book to make it fully searchable online.153 The court also 
stressed that only small parts of a book were shown as search 
results. 
Concerning the fourth factor—market effect—the court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the detrimental 
effects of Google Books on book sales. First, in light of the 
rejection of the class settlement, Google’s plan was no longer to 
sell the books online in competition with vendors through 
which the rightsholders sold their books. Rather, “Google Books 
improves books sales” by “provid[ing] convenient links to 
booksellers to make it easy for a reader to order a book.”154 
Besides, “online browsing in general and Google Books in 
particular helps readers find [author’s] work, thus increasing 
their audiences.”155 The court additionally found it unlikely 
that users would acquire the whole book by conducting 
numerous searches on Google Books. The process would be 
extremely time-consuming, and in any event, the safeguards 
implemented by Google (such as blacklisting parts of the book) 
would frustrate users’ attempts to rebuild books from snippets. 
The court finally referred to the salient benefits of Google 
Books before ultimately upholding it under the fair use 
provision. 
Although Google Books as it currently exists represents 
only a partial solution to the problem of orphan works, which 
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are usually out of print and inaccessible by the public, the court 
recognized that the service gives old books “new life” by 
rendering them readily searchable and accessible online.156 
Indeed, Google Books would have been a comprehensive 
solution to the orphan books problem had the court approved 
the proposed class settlement. In any event, Google Books, as a 
private initiative to solve the orphan works problem, remains 
highly relevant for countries that lack orphan works 
legislation.157 
The remainder of this Article analyzes the “transformative” 
and “commercial intermediation” aspects of Google Books from 
an economic perspective in order to illustrate the Article’s 
proposed approach to these fair use elements. 
B. Economic Analysis of Transformative Use in the 
Case of Google Books 
Google Books is an example of a use that is transformative 
because it changes the purpose of the underlying copyrighted 
works.158 Google has simply scanned and displayed books in 
their existing form, without modifications or additions to their 
content. Yet, the court found Google Books to be “highly 
transformative” in nature.159 It explained: 
The use of book text to facilitate search through 
the display of snippets is transformative. . . . The 
display of snippets of text for search is similar to 
the display of thumbnail images of photographs 
for search or small images of concert posters for 
reference to past events, as the snippets help 
users locate books and determine whether they 
may be of interest.160 
From an economic perspective, putting a copyrighted work 
to an alternative, unintended use may substantially benefit, 
rather than harm, the copyright owner. In the case of Google 
Books, for instance, Google has made complementary rather 
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than substitutive use of the books in question. This is apparent 
from the court’s observation that “Google Books does not 
supersede or supplant books because it is not a tool to be used 
to read books.”161 This is because “Google Books enhances the 
sales of books to the benefit of copyright holders” by “help[ing] 
readers find their work” and “provid[ing] convenient links to 
booksellers.”162 From an economic point of view, Google Books 
has a complementary effect similar to positive book reviews 
that promote and increase the turnover of books.163 As Judge 
Posner observed in Ty: 
[P]ublishers want their books reviewed and 
wouldn’t want reviews inhibited and degraded by 
a rule requiring the reviewer to obtain a 
copyright license from the publisher if he wanted 
to quote from the book. So, in the absence of a 
fair-use doctrine, most publishers would disclaim 
control over the contents of reviews. The doctrine 
makes such disclaimers unnecessary. It thus 
economizes on transaction costs.164 
If Google Books indeed benefits the book rightsholders, why 
not leave Google to negotiate with individual rightsholders 
with respect to the digitization and online display of books? It 
appears that Google, which generates significant revenue from 
Google Books, is a willing licensee, and that rightsholders, who 
benefit financially from the wider publicity of their books, are 
willing licensors. But this ignores the problem of transaction 
costs.165 It would be exorbitantly costly for Google to strike a 
licensing agreement with every rightsholder for every book. 
Google would have to incur overwhelmingly high transaction 
costs, which would likely exceed the revenue to be derived from 
Google Books.166 Hence, denial of the fair use defense would 
likely have led to discontinuation of the Google Books project, 
given that licensing is not a feasible option. 
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It follows from this transaction-cost argument that Google’s 
unauthorized use did not deprive owners of potential licensing 
revenue. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made 
clear in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,167 while “the 
impact on potential licensing revenues is a proper subject for 
consideration in assessing [market effect] . . . . [C]ourts have 
recognized limits on the concept of ‘potential licensing 
revenues’ by considering only traditional, reasonable, or likely 
to be developed markets” in the assessment.168 In the Google 
Books situation, a potential licensing market would be unlikely 
to be developed in the presence of excessively high transaction 
costs, and hence no licensing market harm was caused to the 
book rightsholders.169 To take the argument further, “a 
particular unauthorized use should be considered ‘more fair’ 
when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use.”170 
More generally, market harm arguments based on forgone 
licensing revenue can be criticized for their circular nature—as 
they proceed on the assumption that the user ought to have 
paid—and should be approached with skepticism.171 Courts 
should also query whether forgone licensing revenue, if any, 
will likely discourage the authorship or publication of books 
going forward.172 
Even if Google could feasibly transact with individual book 
rightsholders, “economizing on transaction costs” would still 
justify the court’s decision to uphold Google’s fair use 
defense.173 As scholars have argued, “[b]y giving [book] 
reviewers in effect an automatic royalty-free license, the fair 
use doctrine avoids the costs of explicit transactions between 
publishers and reviewers that would yield the identical 
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outcome.”174 The same logic applies to Google Books: accepting 
Google’s fair use defense obviates the need for tedious and 
costly negotiations between Google and rightsholders, resulting 
in substantial transaction-cost savings which benefit society. 
Transferring part of Google’s profits to rightsholders in the 
form of licensing fees would unlikely incentivize the authorship 
or publication of more (or better quality) books,175 but rather 
disincentivize investment in Google Books and similar projects 
going forward. The educational and other social benefits of 
Google Books cannot be overstated.176  
In sum, the complementarity between Google Books and the 
books it contains, coupled with other economic considerations, 
such as transaction costs, innovation incentives, and Google 
Books’ significant social benefits, buttress the court’s decision 
to approve Google Books as fair transformative use. 
C. Economic Analysis of Commercial Intermediation in 
the Case of Google Books 
Regarding Google’s commercial use of the books as part of 
Google Books, the court made an important point: “[E]ven 
assuming Google’s principal motivation is profit, the fact is that 
Google Books serves several important educational 
purposes.”177 It was important for the court to recognize the 
educational aspect of Google Books: the scanned books are 
ultimately put to educational use by Google Books users, 
notwithstanding Google Books being a profit-making service. 
Internet users could not have made educational uses of the 
books—at least, they could not have done so conveniently by 
running keyword searches—without the Google Books service. 
Google, as a commercial intermediary, is facilitating nonprofit 
educational uses of the books by numerous Internet learners. 
Commercial intermediaries such as Google (and, as 
explained above, copyshops) facilitate the exercise of fair use 
rights by end users by reducing the cost or increasing the 
frequency at which fair uses are made of copyrighted works. 
Despite the fact that such intermediaries derive profit from end 
users in the process of intermediation—an indirect profit 
attributed to heavier Internet traffic in the case of Google 
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Books178—their “commercial use” should be viewed in the 
context of fair use facilitation and hence viewed favorably by 
courts. From an innovative-efficiency perspective, commercial 
reward stimulates entrepreneurship and creative projects that 
foster knowledge dissemination, a central objective of copyright 
law.179 The Google Books project is one example, as a large-
scale, risky educational project that was shouldered by an 
established business organization. As one commentator noted, 
Google “spent up to $100 million digitizing books and took an 
enormous risk in exposing itself to potentially incalculable 
damages in the event of established copyright infringement.”180 
The significant commercial risks inherent in such projects 
could lead to their failure.181 Microsoft terminated a separate 
book digitization project182 in 2008, conceding that “commercial 
considerations played a part in its decision to end the 
program.”183 To deny Google fair use protection for Google 
Books would discourage Google and other companies from 
investing in comparably costly and risky educational projects in 
the future. Without Google’s substantial upfront investment, 
the remarkable social benefits of Google Books could hardly 
have become a reality. The need to preserve commercial 
intermediaries’ innovation incentives, on which society depends 
for the funding of educational or other beneficial projects of a 
substantial scale, is yet another justification for more favorable 
treatment of commercial intermediaries claiming fair use 
protection. 
In situations of transformative commercial use such as  
Google Books, the transformation may greatly reduce market 
harm to the plaintiff, which, in any event, may be rendered 
insignificant by the social benefits achieved, hence overtaking 
commercialism as the dominant consideration.184 This is 
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consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that “[t]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 
of . . . commercialism,”185 and explains the court’s ruling on the 
first fair use factor in Authors Guild.186 The Authors Guild 
court was emphatic about the “significant public benefits” 
brought by Google Books in its decision: 
[Google Books] advances the progress of the arts 
and sciences, while maintaining respectful 
consideration for the rights of authors and other 
creative individuals, and without adversely 
impacting the rights of copyright holders. It has 
become an invaluable research tool that permits 
students, teachers, librarians, and others to more 
efficiently identify and locate books. It has given 
scholars the ability, for the first time, to conduct 
full-text searches of tens of millions of books. It 
preserves books, in particular out-of-print and 
old books that have been forgotten in the bowels 
of libraries, and it gives them new life. It 
facilitates access to books for print-disabled and 
remote or underserved populations. It generates 
new audiences and creates new sources of income 
for authors and publishers. Indeed, all society 
benefits.187 
Thus, the court’s decision in the Google Books case, which 
appeared to give significant recognition to commercial 
intermediaries’ facilitation of educational or other socially 
beneficial uses of copyrighted works, is to be much welcomed.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article critically analyzes, from an economic 
perspective, the transformative and commercial aspects of fair 
use of copyrighted works in the context of Authors Guild v. 
Google, Inc., which found Google Books to be fair use, and 
related cases. It develops an economic approach to analyze 
transformative use and commercial intermediation in 
adjudicating fair use. Economic analysis of transformative use 
focuses on the complementary and substitutive effects as well 
as cost and innovative-efficiency implications of the defendant’s 
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use, instead of focusing on the vague and malleable concept of 
“transformation.” Meanwhile, economic analysis of commercial 
intermediaries suggests that courts should give greater 
recognition to such intermediaries’ role in facilitating the 
public’s educational or other legitimate uses of copyrighted 
works via their cost-efficient production or substantial 
innovative investments. Accordingly, the complementarity 
between Google Books and books, Google’s substantial 
investment in developing Google Books , and transaction-cost 
and innovative-incentive considerations all support the court’s 
decision to uphold Google’s fair use defense. Hopefully, the 
proposed economic approach will be of assistance to courts 
dealing with future copyright cases that concern 
transformative use or commercial intermediation. 
 
 
